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several cognitive domains. This has been attributed to difficulties in forming adequate task 23
representations that help navigate uncertain environments. Here, we investigate how, in older 24 adults, inadequate task representations impact on model-based reversal learning. We combined 25 computational modeling and pupillometry during a novel model-based reversal learning task, 26 which allowed us to isolate the relevance of task representations at feedback evaluation. We 27 find that older adults overestimate the changeability of task states and consequently are less 28 able to converge on unequivocal task representations through learning. Pupillometric measures 29 and behavioral data show that these unreliable task representations in older adults manifest as 30 a reduced ability to focus on feedback that is relevant for updating task representations, and as 31 a reduced metacognitive awareness in the accuracy of their actions. Instead, the data 32 suggested older adults choice behavior was more consistent with a guidance by uninformative 33 feedback properties such as outcome valence. Our study highlights that an inability to form 34 adequate task representations may be a crucial factor underlying older adults' impaired model-35 based inference. 36
Introduction

43
In situations of unreliable or changeable action-outcome relationships we need to rely on 44 abstract task representations to estimate the likely outcomes of our actions, and make adaptive 45 adjustments based on these outcomes. Evidence across several cognitive domains shows that 46 older adults have difficulties in forming adequate task representations (Hämmerer et al., 2014) . 47
For instance, in conflict tasks attentional filtering of inputs based on task representations is less 48 pronounced or absent in older adults (Gazzaley, 2011; Hämmerer et al., 2010; Störmer et al., 49 2013) . In decision making, recent modeling studies show that older adults have difficulties in 50 capturing uncertainties in task representations (Nassar et al., 2016) and show a weaker 51 tendency in deploying model-based decision making . 52
Here we investigate the question of formation of task representations and their influence 53 on decision making in older adults, by comparing choice performance of young and older adults 54 in a model-based reversal learning task (see Figure 1 below ). The task required subjects to infer 55 their current state, framed as to whether the current season is winter or summer, and to also 56 detect switches between the seasons. Participants were not explicitly informed what the current 57 season was, but infered this from sales of winter-specific or summer-specific items. In simple 58 terms, the season was a hidden state. Switches between task states (winter or summer) 59 occurred with a certain frequency (reversal probability) and feedback for correct responses 60 (choosing the seasonally appropriate item) was reliable in 87% of choices (outcome 61 predictability). Participants were informed about the underlying uncertainty in outcome 62 prediction, but were not told the precise reversal probability or outcome predictability. 63
To examine behavior in a fine grained manner we used computational modeling which 64 assessed how these two types of uncertainty were expressed in subjects choices. Based on 65 prior evidence suggestive of inaccurate task representations in older adults (Nassar et al., 66 2016), we predicted older adults would be impaired in representing task uncertainties. 67
Furthermore, as we wanted to investigate whether an inability to form precise task 68 representations impacts on the evaluation of action-outcomes, we recorded changes in pupil 69 diameter during outcome feedback. Pupil diameter is a proxy measure for increased activity of 70 the noradrenergic system, as pupils dilate when increased neuronal activity is triggered in the 71
Locus Coeruleus (Joshi et al., 2016) . Current theories regarding the role of noradrenergic 72 modulation in higher cognitive functions suggests increased noradrenergic modulation during . This way, the amount of gains and losses for (un-)expected outcomes could be 110 balanced. Gain and loss outcomes were balanced for informative (seasonally specific) as well 111 as uninformative (seasonally unspecific) trials. Unlike prior studies, this allowed us to investigate 112 age differences in feedback evaluation based on task representations independent of age 113 differences in the sensitivity to loss or gain outcomes or age differences in processing the 114 expectedness of feedback (Hämmerer et 
Methods
135
Participants
136
A total of 25 healthy younger adults (15 female, mean age = 23.83) and 22 healthy older adults 137 (11 female, mean age = 68.15) participated in the study. Data from 3 older adults had to be 138 excluded due to difficulties in understanding task instructions (switching between task states in 139 around 50% of the trials, N = 2) and faulty pupillometric recordings (N = 1), resulting in a final 140 sample size of 25 younger adults and 19 older adults. Eligibility criteria were being aged 141 between 20 and 30 for younger adults and over 60 for older adults, with normal or corrected to 142 normal vision, English as a first language, and no history of psychiatric disorder. Younger adults 143
were recruited from the UCL ICN subject database, while older adults were recruited via 144 advertisements and contacted by phone and email to assess their eligibility. Written informed 145 consent was obtained from the participants prior to starting the task, and the experiment was 146 approved by the UCL ethics committee. Participants were paid £20 for taking part in the 2h 147 study. ability to establish a model of the task contingencies and use this model to perform inference on 152 a latent state in this task, operationalised as the current season (winter or summer, cf. Figure 1) . 153
Specifically, participants were tasked to bid on either winter or summer items (e.g. warm clothes 154 or bathing suits, hot soup or ice cream) depending on their beliefs about the current season. 155
Participants were not informed about the current season but had to perform trial-by-trial 156 inference on the season based on feedback in the task (operationalised as which seasonal 157 items were currently selling better, see Figure 1 for an illustration). Participants were informed 158 that seasons would remain constant for an extended period of time and encouraged to detect 159 switches in seasons as soon as possible. Importantly, half of the trials in this paradigm were 160 informative whilst the other half of the trials were uninformative for learning about the current 161 season. In informative trials, subjects could choose between a winter and a summer item and 162 receive positive or negative feedback on their chosen item. Thus, in these trials subjects could 163 perform inference on the current season based on their chosen item and received feedback. In 164 uninformative trials, subjects were forced to choose a 'package' consisting of an unknown ratio 165 of winter and summer items. Thus, in these trials, no inference about the current season couldM A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 7 be made. The feedback in both conditions was probabilistic and had a predictability or validity of 167 87% (that is 87% chance of receiving a gain for selling the correct seasonal item on informative 168 trials and the offered package on uninformative trials). In the computational modelling, we 169 treated the estimated outcome predictability (as well as the estimated reversal probability of 170 switches between seasons) as a free parameter that was estimated based on observed 171 behaviour (see below). 172
Finally, on informative as well as on uninformative trials, an unreliable delivery service was 173 introduced to decorrelate choice accuracy from feedback valence. Importantly, this task design 174 allowed us to disentangle the effects for positive and negative, informative and uninformative, as 175 well as expected and unexpected feedback in probabilistic reversal learning. To allow for a clear 176 separation of reversals and probabilistic feedback, trials with invalid feedback were predefined 177 and did not occur within 2 trials of task state reversals. At the end of each trial, participants were 178
asked to indicate what the current task state (season) is as well as how certain they were in 179 their assessment on a 7-point Likert scale (cf. Figure 1) . 180
The task consisted of 324 trials in total separated into 4 blocks of 81 trials each. As part of 181 the remuneration, a bonus payment of £6 was available, depending on the rating accuracy 182 (thresholded at 70% per block) as well as the gains in the task (thresholded at 50 points per 183 block, with gains counting as two points and losses counting as minus one point). Once the task 184 had been completed, participants were given a questionnaire about their current mood, their 185 opinions on the task's difficulty, thier motivaiton to do well on the task and whether they had 186 used any particular strategies for choosing the correct seasonal item. Participants completed an 187 extensive practice session consisting of 50 trials before starting the task to ensure that all 188 participants understood the task. 
Analysis of pupillometric data
217
Cleaned pupillometric data were analysed with respect to condition and age differences in 218 changes of pupil diameter across the task. We used general linear model (GLM) analyses to 219 examine whether trialwise changes in model updating or surprise were reflected in pupil dilation. where responses between seasons were changed (as increased LC firing was observed for 224 response reversals in animals and increased pupil diameters might thus just indicate the 225 decision to switch (Bouret and Sara, 2004) ). This allowed us to assess changes in pupil 226 diameter with model updating and surprise in the course of learning independent of more 227 noticeable trial properties or categorical differences between trials which might result in 228 independent effects on pupil diameters. To assess effects of model parameters on pupil 229 diameters independent of interindividual differences in model parameters, individual regressors 230 were z-scored. Significant differences in pupil diameter between conditions as well as betweenM A N U S C R I P T
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age-groups were assessed with permutation tests (compared against time series with randomly 232 shuffled condition labels across trials within participants (100 repetitions) or age-group labels 233 (1000 repetitions), respectively). Permutation analyses were chosen because pupil diameter 234 measures can be assumed to be autocorrelated across sample points. In this manner, we 235 provided comparison against intact sequences of pupil diameter changes, which had the same 236 extent of autocorrelation. A further advantage of GLM analyses on pupil data is that condition 237 effects as well as age differences in condition effects can be assessed independently of age 238 differences in mean pupil diameter changes across conditions (which are captured in the 239 intercept of the regression analyses). 240
Younger and older adults pupil data did not differ in the number of excluded trials due to 241 artifacts or noisy recordings (t(1,42) = -0.7, p = .86) as well as baseline noise in pupil diameter 242 recordings (t(1,42) = -1.6, p = .12; assessed as mean of standard deviation in time window 243 200ms prior to feedback as well as onset of fixation cross before cue presentation). We would 244 thus not assume to see age differences in pupil data solely due to differences in measurement 245
properties. 246
Analyses of behavioral and model data 247
Individual behavioral data were analysed as aggregated data across the whole task (mean 248 choice accuracy, frequency of switching after gains and losses, see Figure 2 ) as well as 249 aggregated across trials immediately after reversals (first six trials after reversals) and trials later 250 on in learning (7-12 trials after reversals). Reaction times exceeding 3.5 SD as compared to 251 median reaction times were excluded for each individual. Similarly, parameter estimates 252 characterising choice behavior across the whole task (estimated reversal probability, estimated 253 reliability of feedback) were compared across age-groups as well as aggregated across trials 254 (Belief about the season, belief updating) analogous to the behavioral data (first six trial after 255 reversals versus 7-12 trials after reversals) to assess learning after reversals. Non-parametric 256 tests were used when data or model estimates were not normally distributed, greenhouse-257 geisser corrected results were reported when assumptions of shpericity were violated and t-258 tests for groups with unequal variances were reported when variances differed between age 259
groups. 260
Belief about the season was defined as the task state beliefs of the currently correct task 261 state (beliefs independent of task state summer or winter, calculated as | P(task state = winter) -262 0.5 | ) and generally increased after reversals (cf. Figure 3B 
Results
278
We used a probabilistic reversal learning task ( Figure 1 ) to examine adult age differences in 279 relying on adequate task representations in model-based reversal learning. As in a typical 280 probabilistic reversal learning task, participants had to identify alternating task states (winter or 281 summer -alternating with a certain reversal probability per trial (6%)) based on probabilistic 282 feedback (successful sale of winter or summer items -with success of selling seasonally 283 suitable items dependent on a certain pre-set outcome predictability (87%)). 284
On each trial (cf. Figure 1 ), participants were first presented with the items available for 285 bidding by the wholesaler (A). After making their choice (B), the received item was presented. 286
Participants did not always receive the item that they bid on (C), (and this was attributed to an 287 unreliable delivery service) in order to balance learning from losses and gains (i.e. balanced 288 number of expected or unexpected gains and losses across trials, cf. supplementary Table 2 ). 289
After being presented with the delivered item (C), participants were shown whether they made a 290 gain from the sale of the delivered items (D). Outcomes were gains (smiling faces) or losses 291 M A N U S C R I P T
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(frowning faces). Outcomes for correct seasonal items resulted in a profitable sale on about 292 87% of trials, with the 13% of losses attributed to unreliability in customer choices. 293
As outlined above, feedback was uninformative for learning about seasons on half of the 294 trials (participants had to bid on packages of mixed seasonal items, Figure 1 ). Participants were 295 explicitly instructed about the uninformativeness of these trials, i.e. they were told that the ratio 296 of summer or winter items within the package was unknown, and that gains or losses were thus 297 not informative for learning about the current season. Participants were instructed to pick the 298 offered package and informed that choosing the offered package would result in most of the 299 cases in a profit. However, as in informative trials, offered packages were not guaranteed to 300 result in a profit (due to probabilistic feedback), resulting in higher surprise (cf. supplementary 301 trial, a posterior belief is obtained using Bayes rule, based on the prior belief about the current 326 task state, the overall assumed predictability of task states as well as the current outcome 327 history. Posterior beliefs are updated at each trial, taking into account also an assumed overall 328 reversal probability of task states. Updated posterior beliefs served as a prior belief at the 329 subsequent trial. The RW-learning models were a) a standard RW-learning model in which each 330 action value was updated independently for the two seasons, b) a model in which values across 331 seasons were simultaneously updated, c) a model with an adaptive learning rate based on the 332 size of prediction errors (see supplementary Table 1 ). Moreover, we tested a simple switching 333 model where the expected value of a seasonal stimulus on the next trial was only determined by 334 the feedback on the previous trial and not by beliefs or values of the current task state. 
Age differences in the representation of task-inherent uncertainties
346
Individual parameter estimates allowed us to assess whether younger and older adults' differ in 347 their task representations, specifically in their estimates of the task-inherent uncertainties 348
(reversal probability and outcome predictability). Figure 2 shows that younger and older adults 349 did not differ in overall choice accuracy (calculated as percentage of trials when the seasonally 350 appropriate item was chosen). Likewise, estimates of outcome predictability were comparable in 351 both age-groups and similar to actual outcome predictabilities (actual outcome predictability 352 87%, mean estimated outcome predictability in younger as well as older adults 85%, no age-353 group difference (t(1,42) = -.63, p = .53). However, older adults systematically overestimated the 354 reversal probability of seasons (6% actual reversal probability, mean estimated reversal 355 probability in older adults 13%, in younger adults 9%, age-group difference: z = -2.72, p < .01). to understand what these mean for the development of task representations during learning. We 376 examined trial-wise empirical choice behavior and related model estimates following reversals in 377 task states (Figure 3 ). As seen in Figure 2 , overall accuracy (mean of correct seasonal choices 378 across all trials) did not differ between age-groups (t(1, 42) = 0.96, p = .34). However, when 379 examining age differences in trial-wise accuracy after reversals ( Figure 3A) , we found that older 380 adults display more accurate behaviour shortly after a reversal, but failed to attain levels ofM A N U S C R I P T
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choice accuracy as seen in younger adults later after a reversal (F(1, 42) = 4.22, p < .05, rICC = 382 .30, (interaction age-group x trials 1-6 versus 7-12 following a reversal on choice accuracy)). 383
This
98). 392
Note that computational modeling suggests that older adults' inconsistent choice behavior 393
is not due to age differences in choice randomness, as individually estimated values for the 394 inverse temperature did not differ between age-groups ( Figure 2) . Instead, modeling choice 395 behavior suggests that older adults choices are less consistent because they overestimate 396 reversal probabilities of task states and are consequently less able to converge on a consistent 397 belief about the current season. To further probe the effects of overestimating reversal 398 probabilities on learning in older adults, we examined trial-by-trial estimates of uncertainty about 399 the current season, which was treated as a hidden state that had to be inferred. Uncertainty was 400 defined as the entropy of beliefs about the current season (see Figure 3B , calculated 401 as∑ log ).<) = ), which is maximal if agents assign uniform probability to both winter and 402 summer (cf. supplementary Figure 2 and Figures 3B and 3C) . 403
Overall, older adults displayed higher uncertainty about the current season ( Figure 3B) , 404 again indicative of an impaired ability to converge on an unequivocal task representation. This is 405 particularly prevalent in later trials after a reversal (F(1,42) = 4.71, p < .05, rICC = .32), where 406 younger adults show stronger evidence in favour of a task representation that reflects one 407 particular season due to evidence accumulated over time. As seen in simulations of altered 408 reversal probabilities or outcome predictabilities (supplementary Figure 4) , this effect can be 409 attributed to overestimating reversal probabilities such that the higher the assumed reversal 410 probability, the more difficult it is to reduce uncertainties especially later on after reversals. This 411 is also evident when inspecting beliefs after reversals ( Figure 3C , belief estimate of the currently 412 correct task state, e.g. belief to be in summer state if it is summer). Older adults' belief 413 estimates are overall closer to a uniform distribution and plateau at a lower level when beliefs 414
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should be more consistent ( Figure 3C , interaction age-group x belief on first half versus second 415 half of trials after reversals: F(1,42) = 13.50, p < .01, rICC = .49). 416
Effects of overestimating reversal probabilities in older adults are also evident in feedback 417 evaluation during learning. Surprise ( Figure 3D ) indicates how unexpected a feedback is given a 418 current belief, whereas model updating ( Figure 3E ) indicates how much beliefs are changed 419 following an outcome. For older adults, unexpected feedback early after reversals seems less 420 surprising ( Figure 3D, F(1,42) = 7.33, p < .05, rICC = .39, interaction age-group x surprise on 421 trials 1-6 versus 7-12 following a reversal). This speaks to the fact that older adults are worse at 422 evaluating the unexpectedness of outcomes (especially when they are most unexpected), 423 induced by a higher overall uncertainty about the current season. Additionally, later after a 424 reversal, older adults show a trend towards greater model updating as compared to younger 425 adults ( Figure 3E , main effect age-group for model updating trials 7-12 after reversals t(1,42) = -426 1.76, p = .09, no reliable interaction age-group x trials after reversal). Older adults thus seem to 427 modify task state beliefs more than younger adults at times when beliefs should be more 428 consistent due to learning. 
Pupillometric assessment of age differences in belief updating
458
Computational modeling suggests that older adults are more uncertain in their beliefs about the 459 current state (season) and tend to update their established beliefs more. This suggests older 460 adults are less able to incorporate beliefs about task states into the evaluation of action 461 outcomes. As a validation of our modeling results, we examined age groups differences in the 462 extent to which pupil diameters covary with the relevance of feedback for updating beliefs. As 463 outlined above, increases in pupil diameter indicate a greater subjective saliency of events, 464
given inferred hidden states. Larger pupil diameters should thus be observed on trials that are 465 more relevant for altering beliefs about the current state. Hence, a difference in the extent to 466 which pupil diameters covary with model updating between age groups can be used to index a 467 difference in the degree to which subjects incorporate task representations when evaluating 468
feedback. 469
We first examined whether participants differentiated between outcomes that did or did 470 not allow them to learn about the current season, by examining mean pupil responses during 471 feedback for informative and uninformative trials. As outlined above, uninformative trials did not 472 allow subjects to learn about the current season and should therefore elicit smaller pupil 473 dilations as compared to informative trials. Note feedback on informative trials was physically 474 identical to feedback on uninformative trials and similarly frequent in valence and expectedness. 475
As predicted, we found larger pupil diameters during feedback that was informative for learning 476 about task representations (mean feedback response on informative trials, cf. Figure 1 ) 477 compared to the feedback response on uninformative trials (cf. Figure 4A) . However, only in 478 younger adults were there stronger responses for informative feedback (F(1,24) = 39.11, p < 479
.05, rICC = .80, main effect informativeness in younger adults). Older adults instead reacted 480 equally to feedback that was informative and feedback that was uninformative (F(1,19) = 2.49, p 481 = .14; no main effect informativeness in older adults, F(1, 42) = 9.01, p < .05, rICC = .42, age-482 group x informativeness interaction). Post-hoc power analysis showed that our sample size 483 allowed us to detect difference effects of at least d=.60 and larger with a power of at least 80% 484 in older adults. The observed effect size in younger adults was d = 1.2. Older adults thus 485 M A N U S C R I P T
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seemed less able to suppress the subjective salience of feedback which was uninformative for 486 updating task representations. 487
Additionally, across age-groups, we observed a stronger response to loss as compared 488 to gain feedback (F(1, 42) = 8.68, p < .05, rICC = .41), especially on informative trials 489 (interaction loss -gain x informative -uninformative trials F(1, 42) = 9.01, p < .05, rICC = .42). 490
Negative events thus appear more salient, independent of the expectedness of negative events 491 (as expectedness, informativeness, and frequency of gains and losses was balanced). 
512
In a second set of analyses, we examined whether trial-wise changes in pupil dilation 513 covaried with model updating on informative trials. A positive link between pupil dilation and the 514 amount of model updating would suggest an increased salience of feedback that was more 515 relevant for learning. Based on a reduced differentiation of informative and uninformative 516 feedback in older adults, we would expect that they also differentiate trials of large or smallM A N U S C R I P T
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20 model updating less as compared to younger adults. To examine trial-wise relationships 518 between model estimates and pupil diameters, we used a regression which predicted pupil 519 diameter on a given trial. Regressions used a trial-wise estimate of model updating (cf. Figure  520 3E, supplementary Figure 2C ), and surprise (cf. Figure 3D, supplementary Figure 2D ), as well 521 as regressors of no interest (feedback valence, changing seasonal ratings) to predict pupil 522 diameters. As seen in Figure 5A , pupil diameters were positively related to model updating in 523 both age-groups, with larger pupil diameters seen on trials with more model updating. 524
Interestingly, this effect was weaker in older adults (time window of significant age difference in 525 the size of the updating effect indicated by black line in Figure 5A, t(1,42) = 3.55, p < .05) . 526
Inspecting pupil dilation as an indicator of subjective salience thus suggests that older adults 527 pay greater attention to outcomes that do not provide for learning about task states 528 (uninformative trials) and modulate pupil dilation less with trials that inform a change in model 529
updating. 530
Finally, orthogonalising informativeness and expectedness of outcomes in our task 531 allowed us to address whether pupil responses differentiate the mere unexpectedness of an 532 event (surprise) from its informativeness for learning about task representations (model 533 updating). Unlike model updating, trialwise differences in suprise (unexpected outcomes without 534 changes in beliefs) were not reliably reflected in changes in pupil diameter ( Figure 5B regarding the precise sensitivity of an arousal system. In the context of the present study, we 538 find that surprising events are not as subjectively salient as events that allow for model 539 updating. This might be due to the fact that participants were instructed to learn about the 540 current season and hence focused on model updating. However, at least in the case of the older 541 adults, a reduced response to surprising events is unlikely to be attributed to disengaging from 542 the task as they also showed increased pupil diameters on uninformative trials. 543
544
To summarize, at an inter-individual level, we observe older adults overestimate the 545 changeability of task states and commit less to a given task state belief. This means that, 546 compared to younger adults, older adults are consistently less certain in their belief about the 547 current season and are less able to converge on an unequivocal task representation through 548 learning. In line with this, age differences in pupil dilations during feedback processing suggest 549 that older adults are less able to focus on feedback that is informative for learning about task 550 M A N U S C R I P T
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representations. Instead, uninformative feedback appears to be similarly relevant for them and 551 they differentiate less between feedback that allows for more or less model updating. 
Trial-wise ratings on task states 564
Finally, as an additional measure of individual task representations in both age-groups, we 565 asked participants at the end of every trial whether they thought the current season was winter 566 or summer and how certain they were in this assessment (on a scale from 1-4, see Figure 1 and 567 Methods). Interestingly, this revealed that older adults accuracy and certainty in their ratings 568
were less in line with their actual choice performance than was the case for younger adults. As 569 shown above, both age groups display lower choice accuracy immediately after reversalsM A N U S C R I P T
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( Figure 6A ). However, while younger adults showed slowly increasing rating accuracy and rating 571 certainty after reversals, older adults showed higher levels of rating accuracy and certainty 572 already early on after reversals ( Figure 6B , interaction age-group x rating accuracy on first half 573 versus second half of trials after reversals: F(1,42) = 7.02, p < .05, rICC = .38; Figure 6D , 574 interaction age-group x rating certainty on first half versus second half of trials after reversals: 575 F(1,42) = 5.60, p < .05, rICC = .34). Indeed, older adults' overall indicated certainty in their 576 beliefs about the current season was higher than in younger adults (F(1,42) = 4.70, p < .05, 577 rICC = .32), although their choice behavior suggested that they are less certain as compared to 578 younger adults (see also higher choice entropy in older adults in Figure 3D ). The correlation 579 between choice accuracy and rating certainty or rating acccuracy in the first half after reversals 580
(trials 1-6) was therefore overall weaker in older adults than in younger adults ( Figure 6C and 581 6E, correlation choice accuracy and rating accuracy: r = .52, p < .05, 95% CI .49 to .65 in 582 younger adults; r < .01, p = .99, 95% CI -.12 to .13 in older adults; correlation choice accuracy 583 and rating certainy: r = .36, p = .07, 95% CI .30 to .49 in younger adults; r = .06, p = .79, 95% CI 584 -.03 to .21 in older adults). This suggests that older adults track their actual choice accuracy 585 less in their ratings of task state uncertainty. It should be noted that this does not reflect a 586 general inability of older adults to differentiate task state certainty, as both younger and older 587 adults indicated lower certainty about the current task state on uninformative as compared to 588 informative trials (mean certainty (on a scale from 0 to 3) on uninformative trials 1.38 and 1.46 589 for younger and older adults, respectively, and 2.03 and 2.30 on informative trials). Instead, this 590 provides further evidence that older adults are more disposed to switch task state assumptions 591 and hints at a metacognitive deficit in older adults in evaluating current choice certainty 592 precisely in conditions of updating task representations. 
Discussion
600
We investigated whether younger and older adults differ in their ability to form adequate 601 task representations in decision making using a probabilistic reversal learning paradigm, and 602 availing of computational modeling and pupillometry. The computational model based upon a 603
Bayesian learner captured the inherent uncertainties of the task paradigm (estimates of reversal 604 probability and outcome predictability) and allowed us to compare younger and older adults in 605 their ability to form adequate representations of uncertainties in decision making. The data 606 suggest that inconsistent choice behavior in older adults is attributable to overestimating the 607 reversal probability of task states. This means older adults are less able to converge on an 608 unequivocal and sustained task representation (is it winter or summer), even if evidence that 609 favours one task state is available. 610 611 In addition to computational estimates of task representations and metacognitive ratings, 639 our study also assessed changes in pupil diameter. Increased pupil diameter can be indicative 640 of increased noradrenergic modulation and is linked to greater subjective relevance of events. 641
Consequences of overestimating reversal probabilities in older adults
Indeed, we observed larger pupil diameters for informative outcomes and in particular those that 642 allowed to update beliefs about task states in younger adults. However, in line with a reduced 643 ability of older adults to assess the relevance of events based on internal task representations, 644
we found that older adults responded strongly to feedback that allowed for updating beliefs 645 about task states, as well as to feedback that did not allow for updating of beliefs. Also, pupil 646 diameters in older adults varied less with how much learning about task states was possible, if 647 outcomes allowed for updating beliefs. This suggests that older adults indeed show a specific 648 deficit in evaluating outcomes based on internal task representations. This altered outcome 649 processing in older adults cannot be attributed to a disengagement from the task as mean 650 accuracy levels, as well as ratings on task commitment, were comparable between younger and 651 older adults. Likewise, pupil responses were not generally reduced in older adults. 652
Computational modeling as well as pupillometric results instead point to an altered 653 relevance of task representations during model-based reversal learning in older adults. The 654 precision of task representations and the impact of model updating at outcome presentation 655 depend on each other as learning unfolds. A common problem in understanding age differences 656 in model-based reversal learning is to disentangle whether older adults' ability to process 657 outcomes is impoverished because they are less able to develop precise task representations, 658 or whether they struggle with a reduced ability to develop task representations because their 659 ability to process feedback gainfully is reduced (a favoured hypothesis in many studies (de Boer 660 et al., 2017; Hämmerer and Eppinger, 2012). Our study is a step towards disentangling these 661 two explanations. We included a condition that assessed feedback evaluation when it could not 662 be used for learning about task state beliefs (uninformative trials), thereby breaking the link 663 between feedback response and updating beliefs about task representations. In this condition 664 we observed notable age-group differences consistent with older adults taking task 665 representations less into account when judging feedback. It is interesting to speculate that this 666 age effect may be in part a reaction to a reduced ability to form reliable internal task Finally, we note that postmortem evidence on neuronal loss in the noradrenergic locus 708 coeruleus (LC) during ageing suggests a reduced potential for noradrenergic modulation in 709 older adults (Mann, 1983; Mather et al., 2015) . In the context of this study, one might expect to 710 see overall reduced pupil dilation, reflecting an overall reduced LC functionality in older adults. 711
Indeed, a recent study observed smaller pupil dilation to salient negative events in older adults 712 (Hämmerer et al., 2017) . In the present study, we did not find lower pupil dilation in older adults. 713
However, this is not conclusive evidence against reduced noradrenergic levels in older adults. 714
As outlined above, if an event is salient given its relevance in a particular task context, the 715 strength of a functional response will also depend on a given task focus. In addition to age 716 differences in biological substrates for processing salient events, age differences in attentional 717 focus on salient events need to be taken into account. As processing salient events (outcomes) 718 in our task happened within a task context that required a focus on outcomes, we cannot 719 address these two aspects separately in this study. Indeed, pupillometric responses of 720 comparable strength in younger and older adults are not unprecedented in feedback-based 721 learning tasks (Hämmerer et al., 2017) . In the context of our task, this suggests that the strength 722 of attentional focus on outcome evaluation might have been comparable in younger and older 723 adults. However, adaptation to evaluating outcomes in light of current task state representations 724 was reduced in older adults, evident in a reduced differentiation of outcomes that allowed 725 learning about task state representations. 726 727
Conclusion
728
To conclude, we show that older adults form less reliable beliefs about task states and 729 have more difficulties in updating task representations through learning from choice outcomes. 730
This reduced ability to converge on unequivocal internal task representations in older adults was 731 accompanied by an inaccurate description of choice accuracies and choice certainties in 732 confidence ratings, an increased tendency to guide choices by external cues as well as a 733 reduced ability to evaluate outcomes based on internal task representations. A deficit in forming 734 or maintaining precise task representations has been proposed to underlie cognitive deficits in 
